Saturday, April 25, 2020

South African Airways Repatriates Stranded South Africans From Miami


Photo: South African Airways

South African Airways
Media Release
April 15, 2020

South African Airways Repatriates Stranded South Africans From Miami

Fort Lauderdale, FL (April 15, 2020) – South African Airways (SAA), repatriated over 300 South African citizens on April 14, 2020 aboard a specially planned charter flight from the Miami International Airport(MIA) to South Africa. Thisflight, chartered by Workaway International, operated with SAA’s new state-of-the art flagship Airbus A350-900 aircraft, departed Miami on Tuesday evening en route to Johannesburg, Cape Town and Durban. Workaway International is a USA-based recruiting agency, headquartered in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida, whose mission is to provide young South Africans with the opportunity for employment in the hospitality industry in South Florida during the traditional high tourist season of November through May. Due to the onset of the COVID-19 virus, many of the golf resorts and other business in the hospitality industry that employed these young adults have temporarily closed, requiring the South Africans to return home.

“SAA and Workaway International have enjoyed a long-standing partnership and we are honoured to be working with them on this special repatriation flight to carry this group of young South Africans home to reunite with family and loved ones,” said Todd Neuman, executive vice president, North America for South African Airways. “We felt a great sense of pride in seeing the excitement from this group as they boarded our A350-900 aircraft with the beautiful colors of the South African flag
emblazoned on the tail and the warm greetings from SAA staff as they embarked on their journey home.”

“MIA is proud to be open and operational, so that we can help facilitate the return of these South African nationals to their homeland during these challenging times,” said Lester Sola, Miami International Airport Director and CEO.

SAA has taken measures to ensure that the airport staff, cabin crew and flight deck crew were safe and secure by providing the appropriate training and protective clothing as approved by the World Health Organization’s Communicable Disease Plan. Health screening protocols were conducted
at the airport for each passenger boarding the flight and upon arrival in South Africa, the group will be placed in quarantine for 14 days in accordance with South African government travel regulations to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the country.

END

Sec. Pompeo Calls Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed




Office of the Spokesperson
Department of State
Washington, DC
April 13, 2020

The statement below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:‎

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed.  Secretary Pompeo thanked the Prime Minister and Ethiopian Airlines for their continued support to provide flights to American citizens stranded overseas by the COVID-19 pandemic.  The Secretary underscored the United States’ commitment to supporting Ethiopia and working with international partners to respond to the ongoing public health emergency.  The Secretary and the Prime Minister also discussed the importance of the U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral relationship and stressed the need for continued collaboration on key regional issues.

Sec. Pompeo Calls Egyptian Foreign Minister Shoukry, Thanks EgyptAir




Office of the Spokesperson
Department of State
Washington, DC
April 7, 2020

The statement below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry. Secretary Pompeo and Foreign Minister Shoukry discussed regional issues and emphasized the importance of cooperation during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Secretary thanked the Foreign Minister and EgyptAir for scheduling special flights to repatriate American citizens.

Sec. Pompeo Calls Sudannese PM Abdalla Hamdok




Office of the Spokesperson
Department of State
Washington, DC
April 1, 2020

The statement below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke with Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok today. Secretary Pompeo and Prime Minister Hamdok reaffirmed the importance of a successful democratic transition in Sudan and the importance of moving forward with appointment of a Transitional Legislative Council and civilian governors. The Secretary reiterated U.S. support for the civilian-led transitional government and its efforts to build a lasting peace in Sudan. The two leaders continued discussions regarding the policy and statutory requirements for consideration of rescission of Sudan’s State Sponsor of Terrorism designation. Secretary Pompeo and Prime Minister Hamdok discussed the COVID-19 global pandemic and U.S.-Sudanese cooperation to combat the virus.

Sec. Pompeo Calls Former Ethiopian PM Desalegn, Thanks Ethiopian Airlines

Photo: Wikipedia

Office of the Spokesperson
Department of State
Washington, DC

March 31, 2020

The statement below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:‎

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with former Ethiopian Prime Minister Hailemarriam Desalegn. Secretary Pompeo highlighted the importance of the U.S.-Ethiopian bilateral relationship and stressed the importance of continued collaboration on key regional issues. The Secretary reiterated the United States’ support for Ethiopia’s ongoing reforms and the importance of ensuring that the upcoming elections are free and fair.

U.S. Extends Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians




Office of the Press Secretary
The White House

March 30, 2020

Memorandum on Extension of Deferred Enforced Departure for Liberians

Since March 1991, certain Liberian nationals and persons without nationality who last habitually resided in Liberia (collectively, “Liberians”) have been eligible for either Temporary Protected Status (TPS) or Deferred Enforced Departure (DED), allowing them to remain in the United States despite being otherwise removable.

In a memorandum dated March 27, 2018, I determined that, although conditions in Liberia had improved and did not warrant a further extension of DED, the foreign policy interests of the United States warranted affording an orderly transition (“wind-down”) period to Liberian DED beneficiaries.  At that time, I determined that a 12-month wind-down period was appropriate; that wind-down period expires on March 31, 2019.

Upon further reflection and review, I have decided that it is in the foreign policy interest of the United States to extend the wind-down period for an additional 12 months, through March 30, 2020.  The overall situation in West Africa remains concerning, and Liberia is an important regional partner for the United States.  The reintegration of DED beneficiaries into Liberian civil and political life will be a complex task, and an unsuccessful transition could strain United States-Liberian relations and undermine Liberia’s post-civil war strides toward democracy and political stability.  Further, I understand that there are efforts underway by Members of Congress to provide relief for the small population of Liberian DED beneficiaries who remain in the United States.  Extending the wind-down period will preserve the status quo while the Congress considers remedial legislation.

The relationship between the United States and Liberia is unique.  Former African-American slaves were among those who founded the modern state of Liberia in 1847.  Since that time, the United States has sought to honor, through a strong bilateral diplomatic partnership, the sacrifices of individuals who were determined to build a modern democracy in Africa with representative political institutions similar to those of the United States.

Pursuant to my constitutional authority to conduct the foreign relations of the United States, I hereby direct the Secretary of Homeland Security to take appropriate measures to accomplish the following:

(1)  The termination of DED for all Liberian beneficiaries effective March 31, 2020;

(2)  A continuation of the wind‑down period through March 30, 2020, during which current Liberian DED beneficiaries who satisfy the description below may remain in the United States; and

(3)  As part of that wind-down, continued authorization for employment through March 30, 2020, for current Liberian DED beneficiaries who satisfy the description below.

The 12-month wind-down period and 12-month continued authorization for employment shall apply to any current Liberian DED beneficiary who has continuously resided in the United States since October 1, 2002, but shall not apply to Liberians in the following categories:

(1)  Individuals who are ineligible for TPS for reasons set forth in section 244(c)(2)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)(B));

(2)  Individuals whose removal the Secretary of Homeland Security determines to be in the interest of the United States;

(3)  Individuals whose presence or activities in the United States the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe would have potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences for the United States;

(4)  Individuals who have voluntarily returned to Liberia or their country of last habitual residence outside the United States;

(5)  Individuals who were deported, excluded, or removed before the date of this memorandum; or

(6)  Individuals who are subject to extradition.

The Secretary of Homeland Security is authorized and directed to publish this memorandum in the Federal Register.

DONALD J. TRUMP

MCC CEO’s Remarks at Powering Africa Summit

Sean Cairncross, MCC CEO Photo courtesy of MCC

MCC CEO Sean Cairncross’ Remarks at the Powering Africa Summit

For Immediate Release
Millennium Challenge Corporation
February 24, 2020

MIAMI, FLORIDA, February 24, 2020 – Today, MCC CEO Sean Cairncross delivered remarks at the 6th Annual Powering Africa Summit in Miami, Florida. The Summit brought together more than 370 energy leaders from Africa with innovative technology providers and investors from North America to accelerate business between the two continents.

Read his full remarks below:

Hello, thank you—I am so glad to join all of you this afternoon.

Thank you, Ambassador [of the Republic of Mozambique] Carlos dos Santos, for leading this important discussion here today.

Mozambique is one of our most recently selected partner countries, and MCC looks forward to working closely with you in the months and years to come.

My name is Sean Cairncross, and I am the CEO of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, or MCC.

I am thrilled to be here in Miami alongside so many wonderful partners—each aiming to bring power to more people in Africa by working together to strengthen the energy sector across the continent.

Development of, and investment in, the African power sector is one of the most important challenges of our time; for the Millennium Challenge Corporation it is also one of the greatest opportunities.

In my many visits to our MCC partner countries—like Malawi—I’ve seen first-hand how U.S. Government investment in the power sector has changed lives—putting countries on a path toward greater economic prosperity.

Grace Ghambi is a fourth-year electrical engineering student at the University of Malawi because of an MCC-sponsored scholarship. While visiting Nkula power plant outside of Blantyre, Grace explained to me that MCC’s investment made her education possible.

And now—after she finishes her schooling—Grace wants to come back and assist on implementing further MCC investment by working at ESCOM, an electrical utility in Malawi that is helping to privatize the energy sector. She has also started a girls mentoring group, sharing information and encouraging young women to reach their dreams, and inside of two years she has reached thousands of young girls in Malawi.

If that’s not a good demonstration of America’s power to inspire—to drive economic prosperity through investment in the energy sector—I don’t know what is.

MCC is the largest U.S. Government contributor of power infrastructure funding under Power Africa to date.

Those of you familiar with MCC know that our development model is different.

By design, our approach brings together the rigor, analysis, and expertise of the private sector and donor agencies—but all with one focus—to reduce poverty through economic growth—to move these countries from aid partners to trade partners.

And, where and how we work are subject to several rules.

Put simply, we only work with developing countries that are well governed. That is, they are low or lower-middle income and they have demonstrated a commitment to consolidating the reform necessary to build economic freedom, ruling justly, and be responsive to their citizens. These countries must be democratically governed and actively working to prevent corruption.

Our investments are grants—not loans that could add to a country’s debt burden—and they are limited to just five years, so there is real incentive to get things done.

But don’t let the five-year timeline make you think these are easy—we tackle difficult problems and push our partners on complex reforms alongside our big infrastructure investments.

What sets MCC apart is its data-driven decision-making process. We first look at what factors are holding back a country’s economy, and then we work directly with our partner government to design the investment.

MCC is built on country ownership—so our partner country governments, civil society, and the private sector are leading the way in identifying the problem, designing the solution, and implementing the investment from day one.

The story of MCC is really all about consistently applying these principles of effectiveness and accountability—proving that U.S. development dollars go beyond just rhetoric—we put ideas into action, to get real results.

To date, MCC has signed 37 compacts with 29 countries.

And, currently, about two thirds of our partner countries are in Africa.

Across the continent we currently have six compacts in implementation, and four in development.

Our active power sector investments are in Benin, Ghana, Liberia, and Senegal.
 
Each of these compacts directly address the lack of reliable, affordable power holding these countries back from achieving the kind of economic growth that will lift more of their citizens out of poverty.

When MCC makes these multi-million dollar investments in the power sector, we pair our major infrastructure projects with reforms that will improve the policies and institutions that govern the sector—we insist on this model to 1) ensure country ownership and accountability, 2) to ensure the sustainability of our investments and, 3) to create a stable environment that encourages private investment in the power sector in each of these countries.

One example I touched on this morning, but that I’d like to highlight again is Benin.

MCC’s $375 million Benin 2 Power Compact aims to strengthen the country’s power grid, including on-grid solar generation and off-grid power solutions.

And, funding for each of these projects is conditioned. Meaning, the Government of Benin must achieve specific institutional and utility reforms before any MCC funding is released. An example of this is tariff reform—to establish both Independent Power Producers and off-grid enabling environments, as well as improved utility governance to introduce private industry participation into the power sector.

This is important for three reasons.

One, it speaks to the agency’s unique model and our ability to incentivize and drive reforms before any American taxpayer dollars go out the door. Our data-driven programs are designed to increase accountability and deliver quality results and cost-effective investments on behalf of the American people—investments that not only align with U.S. values and national security interests, but also maximize the impact of each dollar spent, and open up new markets to U.S. businesses around the globe.

And two, MCC plays a unique role within the development trajectory of its partner countries by working directly with the government in driving reforms to create a sustainable, investment-ready environment. We insist that our country partners uphold the rule of law, work to eliminate corruption, and consolidate democratic and free market reforms to attract private investment and open up capital markets within the sector.

Finally, the MCC development model insists upon self-reliance and increases a country’s ability to tackle problems on their own. Our compacts build capacity through country ownership and drive sustainable economic growth that creates jobs and real economic opportunities.

Through these foundational principles of transparency, country ownership, and mutual accountability for results, MCC stands in stark contrast to the debt-laden development models, such as Belt and

Road, which fuels debt, economic distress, and threatens a country’s autonomy and stability.

Our approach has a sustained impact—Chinese projects often leave only the infrastructure behind—typically without the necessary sustainability measures in place—but MCC’s programs invest in infrastructure and capacity building—leaving behind strengthened institutions, ministries, and utilities, with trained local labor, and market ready economies.

Just as important, MCC‘s process brings along members of a partner country’s civil society—strengthening stability.

Elsewhere in West Africa, MCC’s $600 million Senegal II Power Compact includes the construction of a 225 kilovolt network around Dakar, accounting for 60% of the country’s electrical demand. This new, reliable high-voltage network will encourage private-sector investment in generation, resulting in lower electricity costs.

MCC also funded a long-term strategy and action plan that underpinned Senegal’s power sector reform to provide more legal clarity in the sector and help ensure the financial viability of the country’s electrical utility.

Looking ahead, MCC is developing a compact with Burkina Faso. The proposed compact includes MCC’s biggest investment in battery storage to date, which aims to assist Burkina Faso’s continued diversification away from its legacy high-cost thermal plants, and toward increased solar power and regional imports.

Through these and other investments in power infrastructure and sector reforms, MCC is furthering the larger goals of the U.S. and Power Africa, advancing our mission to reduce poverty through economic growth. MCC remains committed to working with our partner country governments, the private sector, and civil society, across Africa, to unlock the continent’s economic potential.

We are also sending a clear message that the United States is serious about building lasting partnerships—moving aid partners to trade partners—leading to a more prosperous and stable world.

The challenge of powering the African continent is enormous, but through 1), collaboration, 2), innovation, and 3)—and arguably the most important—accountability, together, we will get the job done.

Thank you.

###

Friday, April 17, 2020

U.S. Condemns Assassination Attempt Against Sudanese Prime Minister Hamdok



Morgan Ortagus
Department of State Spokesperson
Washington, DC

March 9, 2020

The United States condemns in the strongest possible terms today’s attack on Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok’s convoy in Khartoum and offers our condolences to the loved ones of victims killed or injured in the attack. We continue to monitor the situation closely and stand ready to assist the Sudanese government as we may be able.

The United States strongly supports Sudan’s civilian-led transitional government. We stand with it and the Sudanese people in their pursuit of peace, security, prosperity, democracy, and equality.


U.S. and Gabon Assume the Co-Secretariat of the Friends of Gulf of Guinea

Photo: Wikipedia

Morgan Ortagus, Department of State Spokesperson
March 4, 2020

The Department of State is pleased to announce that the United States and the Republic of Gabon have assumed the co-secretariat of the Friends of Gulf of Guinea, also known as the FoGG, for calendar year 2020.  Working together, we will promote unimpeded global commerce and freedom of navigation; strengthen sustainable marine ecosystems, including fish stocks and related seafood supply chains; and enhance maritime governance in the Gulf of Guinea.  The Gulf of Guinea is vital for the shipment of goods, but it is also a rich marine ecosystem that millions of Africans depend on for their livelihoods.  We welcome the active participation of all the regional coastal states to make progress in these critical areas.

Sec. Pompeo Meets DRC President Tshisekedi

 
Photo: State Department

Office of the Spokesperson
Department of State
Washington, DC

March 3, 2020

The statement below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:‎

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo met with Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) President FĂ©lix Tshisekedi today in Washington, DC.  Secretary Pompeo and President Tshisekedi discussed strengthened ties between the United States and the DRC in the year since the country’s historic peaceful transfer of power. They pledged to work together to advance the U.S.-DRC Privileged Partnership for Peace and Prosperity which launched after President Tshisekedi visited Washington D.C. last April.

Secretary Pompeo expressed support for President Tshisekedi’s reform agenda to tackle corruption, strengthen democratic institutions, improve human rights, end impunity, combat trafficking in persons, and promote peace in eastern DRC.  The Secretary also reiterated our steadfast support for Congolese efforts to end the ongoing Ebola outbreak and to enhance partnership on the Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA).

Both leaders expressed hope that the DRC can continue a positive trajectory and realize its vast potential.


Thursday, April 16, 2020

Two Africans Among 2020 International Women of Courage Award Recipients




Washington, DC
March 3, 2020

Background

Now in its 14th year, the Secretary of State’s IWOC Award recognizes women around the globe who have demonstrated exceptional courage and leadership in advocating for peace, justice, human rights, gender equality, and women’s empowerment, often at great personal risk and sacrifice.  Since the inception of this award in March 2007, the Department of State has recognized 134 women from 73 countries. This year will bring the total to 146 awardees from 77 countries. U.S. diplomatic missions overseas nominate one woman of courage from their respective host countries. The finalists are selected and approved by senior Department officials. Following the IWOC ceremony, the 12 awardees will participate in an International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) visiting various cities throughout the country, before reconvening in Los Angeles for the conclusion of their program on March 16.

The 2020 African awardees are:

Claire Ouedraogo (Burkina Faso)




Claire Ouedraogo is the President of the Songmanegre Association for Women’s Development (Association fĂ©minine songmanegre pour le dĂ©veloppement), an organization she founded that focuses on eliminating female genital mutilation/cutting (FGM/C) and promoting female empowerment through family planning education, vocational training, and micro-credit for women in the rural and underserved Center North region of Burkina Faso. She also serves as a senior advisor on the National Council to Combat Female Genital Mutilation. She is an active member of the Burkinabe Movement for Human and People’s Rights. In 2016, the prime minister of Burkina Faso nominated her as an Ambassador of Peace for her work in empowering rural women. Despite the increased threat of terrorist attacks and violent acts against civilians in Bam Province, Mrs. Ouedraogo continues her courageous work on behalf of vulnerable women threatened both by FGM/C and terrorism.

Dr. Rita Nyampinga (Zimbabwe)








 Dr. Rita Nyampinga has been a human rights defender for more than 35 years, fighting for gender equality in the workplace since she joined a trade union in 1983.  She is also a trained mediator, and a mentor for girls and young women in leadership.  Her experiences during detention led her to form the Female Prisoners Support Trust to support women and children in detention and raise awareness of the appalling conditions they face. Dr. Nyampinga continues to serve on several boards including Women Coalition of Zimbabwe, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition, Women Academy on Political Leadership Excellence, and Women AIDS Support Network.  Her goal is to see a world that protects and respects the rights of prisoners through a just and fair legal system that is nondiscriminatory based on gender.  In 2010 she became the Social and Economic Justice Ambassador for Zimbabwe’s Coalition on Debt and Development.  Dr. Nyampinga won the Female Human Rights Activist of the Year in 2014 from Alpha Media House.

Sec. Pompeo’s Call with Tunisian Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh

Photo: Reuters

Office of the Spokesperson
Department of State
Washington, DC

March 2, 2020

The statement below is attributable to Spokesperson Morgan Ortagus:‎

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo spoke today with Tunisian Prime Minister Elyes Fakhfakh.  Secretary Pompeo congratulated Prime Minister Fakhfakh on forming a new government.  The Secretary expressed his commitment to continuing the strong bilateral relationship between the United States and Tunisia with Prime Minister Fakhfakh’s government and strengthening economic and commercial ties.  He also discussed the United States’ ongoing partnership with Tunisia in multilateral fora, including the United Nations Security Council.

U.S. Engagement with Libya




 
MODERATOR: Today’s briefing will be on background, attribution to a senior department official or State Department official. And [Senior State Department Official] is going to start with remarks and then will take a few of your questions. We think we have about 20 minutes or so. Go ahead.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. So on Libya, U.S. Government is immersed in efforts to support an immediate end to Libya’s ongoing conflict and minimize toxic foreign interference, with the goal of fostering a stable, unified, and democratic Libyan state that can partner with the U.S. to defeat terrorism and stabilize energy production. We meet regularly with Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj, General Khalifa Haftar, and other Libyan leaders as part of our effort to de-escalate the fighting and demonstrate that the underlying drivers of the conflict can be addressed through political negotiations.

This risks becoming a proxy war. The Libyan civil conflict, reignited in April 2019 when Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army launched a military offensive to seize Tripoli from the Government of National Accord, which was established by the 2015 Libya political agreement and is led by Prime Minister al-Sarraj. Ten months of inconclusive fighting with frontlines roughly 10 miles outside central Tripoli that have remained largely unchanged since April 5th last year have amply demonstrated that there is no military solution to the conflict, short of a bloodbath or a long-term insurgency.

Both the LNA and the GNA have sought military and financial support from outside backers, transforming the Tripoli conflict into a regional proxy war over political and economic clout in the broader Middle East. All sides seek to leverage these considerable investments to advance their security and commercial interests.

Our embassy is supporting efforts by the UN Special Representative Ghassan Salame to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and a comprehensive political settlement. We coordinate closely with the UK, France, Italy, Germany, Egypt, UAE, and Turkey. On January 19th, the UN and the German Government convened the long-anticipated Berlin conference, in which all key foreign players in the Libya conflict committed to suspend military operations and halt the influx of foreign weapons and fighters. We support UNSMIL as the mediator able to move this process forward. That’s the external track.

UNSMIL, the UN mission, is also focusing on an internal track with a series of intra-Libyan dialogues which seek to address difficult issues, including the role played by militia groups throughout the country, the reunification of Libya’s economic institutions, and disagreement about which political groups should be represented in a future Libyan government. The UN convened in Geneva just Wednesday of this week Libya’s first political dialogue since the LNA’s military offensive on Tripoli last April with the goal of bringing together members from the eastern House of Representatives, the so-called High State Council, and broader Libyan civil society. Unfortunately, some invited participants are attempting to veto that process in a self-serving bid to prolong the unsustainable status quo.

The UN has also succeeded in facilitating parallel economic talks in Tunis on January 6th, Cairo February 9th to 10th, with the goal of spurring Libyan factions to bolster economic transparency and promote the equitable distribution of oil revenues. Earlier this month, the GNA and the LNA each sent five representatives to the February 4 to 9 UN-led security discussions in Geneva, the so-called 5+5 dialogue, on the modalities of ceasefire and the terms of the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries.

We can talk a little bit about the humanitarian situation. Obviously, this conflict has had a humanitarian impact. But maybe the three messages I’d like to highlight today are, first of all, that the LNA offensive should be suspended immediately so that political negotiations can succeed. As I said, this has the risk of becoming a large-scale proxy war involving Turkey, Russia, the UAE, and Egypt.

It’s clear that in asking the LNA to suspend its offensive we’re not – that there is a role for Haftar in shaping Libya’s political future. Nobody is saying there isn’t; nobody is asking him to surrender. But we think that the way he is going to advance the goals he’s talking about are best – is best done at the negotiating table. And of course, this is just the first step in de-escalating the overall conflict. But it’s got to begin with suspending the current offensive.

The second point is we support the UN role in convening the negotiations that have taken place between both sides on the military, economic, and political issues. Ghassan Salame we think is doing an excellent job, and we call on all parties to support his efforts.

And the third thing is we’re determined to reopen our embassy in Tripoli as soon as humanly possible. That is not going to be an immediate prospect because of security conditions. Our property was looted. We have a long way to go. It’s going to begin with baby steps, with day trips, then with longer overnights, and then ultimately trying to get some physical facilities on the ground.

I got to post last August and only made my first trip to Libya two weeks ago. I got to Benghazi, which is in a more stable part of the country. I met with Haftar there. I have met with Sarraj multiple times, but it’s hard to do it inside the – I can’t get into Tripoli just yet.

Obviously, the legacy of what happened in Benghazi in 2012 very much colors the concern, the considerations that go into sending any Americans back into Libya, so that there’s a regimented clearance process for that kind of travel. But again, I am able to meet with leaders from all sides, if not in Libya then in the neighborhood.

So with that, I’m happy to take some questions.

MODERATOR: Okay. Katrina.

QUESTION: Thanks. Katrina Manson from Financial Times. Thanks. Given your call for Haftar to stop, can you tell us a little bit about the support that UAE and others have been providing to him and the kind of pressure you’re putting on them to stop their support and encourage him to cease his operations, too?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: We have spoken to all of the parties that are involved in supplying all sides of this conflict. The approach we’re taking is to try to essentially get across the idea it’s not in anyone’s interest for you to fuel this conflict; it’s only going to escalate, as we’ve seen it doing, into a regional proxy war.

Obviously, some of these countries are countries with which the U.S. has multiple equities and deep and complex relationships. I – so Libya is not the defining issue in those relationships necessarily, but they have heard our message. The conflict – to the extent the conflict is fueled in part by outside actors, they have deep and deeply felt concerns of their own about the role of political Islam, about the stability of their regimes, about regional influence. And we can share our views, but we can’t necessarily force them to alter their behavior.

Our main point is you’ve all signed up to obligations under the UN, and the UN has passed the resolutions calling on everybody to observe an arms embargo. You should observe it. And that applies to the UAE; it applies to Turkey; it applies to Russia and a few others.

MODERATOR: Humeyra.

QUESTION: Hi. Are you doing anything to get the oil blockade lifted? A couple of days ago, the eastern side said they can’t force an end to it because it was a popular decision. You’re doing a bunch of things with them. You’re talking to them. But are you doing anything specifically with regards to the oil?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I mean, we have called for an end to the oil blockade. We have spoken with the various parties about the importance of ending this blockade as quickly as possible. We’re not really convinced this is the result of a popular or tribal dissatisfaction. I think this has been – whatever concerns there were originally that at a local level we think have been manipulated with the intention of using oil as a political tool.

That’s obviously not in Libya’s interests. The result now is that Libya’s oil revenues have almost entirely been shut off. The country is having to live off its reserves, which are not insubstantial, but this is not a way to manage the country. And it is already having a humanitarian impact, and we believe that this should stop soon.

We met with Mr. Mustafa Sanalla, the head of the National Oil Corporation, last week before I came back. He’s working on this issue. He’ll be at what’s called CERAWeek in Houston in March. We’re trying to use that as a platform also to send the signal that this oil blockade needs to stop.

MODERATOR: Carol.

QUESTION: I was wondering what you – what your assessment or what’s the U.S. assessment of what it would really take for General Haftar to stand down in the offensive against Tripoli. And short of calling for it to end, is the United States doing anything to make that happen other than calling for an end to it?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Time will tell. I’m going to leave it at that.

QUESTION: Whoa.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sorry.

QUESTION: Is that the answer to both my questions or —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, what was the —

QUESTION: Well, the first one is what would it take for him? What’s he looking for? What would it take for him to stand down?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I mean, you’d have to ask him. He is – I think everybody’s who’s dealt with him has come away understanding that this is a person with a very fixed view of things. But if he really does have his country’s best interests at heart, if he really is determined, which he says he is, to go after what we call the three Ms – the militias, the money, and the Muslim Brotherhood – what he is doing now is directly counterproductive to those goals. He is – his offensive is empowering militias in Tripoli. It’s empowering extremists. It’s making it impossible to track how the money’s being distributed across the country. So if he’s really interested in doing the best thing for Libya, and I will take him at his word that he is, then the thing to do right now would be to suspend his activities – again, we’re not calling on him to surrender – suspend the offensive and give the negotiating process a chance.

MODERATOR: Okay. Michael.

QUESTION: Sir, you mentioned the toxic role that outside players have had in Libya. And can you please explain: What specifically is Turkey doing? Its Turkish military personnel plus Turkish-backed Syrian fighters seem to have been imported there in the thousands. What, specifically, is the Russians doing with the Wagner Group? What is the UAE doing? Can you give us some information as to what these specific outside forces are doing in the conflict in numbers and weapons systems they’re bringing in? And his – just to clarify maybe your answer to a previous question, has any of this slowed down or abated, or is it just ongoing despite calls for them to observe an —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, in answer to the last part, I think I’d say things do wax and wane a little bit, but that kind of relates to how I would answer your question overall. There was a sequence to this. It kind of began on one side. And as that side ramped up, and as they supported Haftar and as his offensive became more and more threatening to the government in Tripoli, that government went out and asked for help. They went to the Turks and they said, we need you. And the Turks said okay. And they had their reasons. There was the maritime agreement that was signed on maritime economic zones and possible oil exploration that was, I think, the price the Turks asked for. But they made a commitment to then support the government in Tripoli, which has actually, or at least until a couple weeks ago, stabilized the situation and was probably responsible for the parties deciding to take part in these 5+5 talks in Geneva.

When folks look eyeball to eyeball and say do we really want this to escalate? Maybe not. I think the Emiratis at that point told Haftar you should go to Geneva. The Turks encouraged the GNA to do that. But where it goes from here is an open question.

The thing with Turkey is complicated by what’s going on in Idlib now. The Russians have got the Turks in a very difficult situation. And there’s an interplay between what’s going on in Idlib and what’s going on in Tripoli that I don’t think anyone has completely figured out yet. The Russian presence, of course, the thousands of Wagner mercenaries is immensely destabilizing. And that was kind of the big game changer back in the fall when that – when people woke up and realized this presence was there in support of Haftar. And it became clear that not just regional, but even U.S. interests were also at stake here, because it’s clear the Russians see strategic advantage now in Libya – low risk and high gain.

And so where this goes from here will be a factor of whether ultimately these – what’s now a proxy war involving proxies, whether this actually becomes a conflict between – it’s not hard to imagine the Turks shooting – killing Russians in Tripoli, or the Turks shooting down an Emirati plane, or an – or the – there could easily be something that now raises this to international conflict levels. And our view is that, and our belief is that none of these parties wants things to reach that level.

QUESTION: And who are the Syrian – the Turkish-backed Syrian fighters that are going there? And what about the Emiratis, what are they doing?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: My – I mean, there have been varying degrees of sophisticated weaponry introduced by various sides. I’m not an expert on all that. My impression is the Emiratis have pulled back a little bit in recent days or weeks. The interesting thing in a way is that each side has got its mercenaries. Haftar’s got the Wagner folks. And for some reason, Erdogan decided to send these Free Syrian Army fighters from Idlib. I don’t pretend to understand why he started with them. There are regular Turkish forces also in Tripoli, and a really good point of departure, if we could first consolidate the ceasefire, would then be to start getting the mercenaries out.

MODERATOR: Dan.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On both sides.

QUESTION: Thank you.

QUESTION: What is the U.S. prepared to do in terms of using its leverage or influence, diplomatic or military power, to change the situation? Because the way you’re describing it, it does sound almost like you’re a spectator on the sides, and these – part of Russia’s seizing the initiative, Turkey is taking action. Is Libya a place where the U.S. will just have to watch these – this proxy war play out?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I mean, I think my answer to that would be it’s interesting to see how all of the parties, both in Libya and among the Europeans, believe that the United States influence can play a pivotal role in bringing this to a resolution, and not through military force. I think it’s because so many of these parties have specific vested interests, and nobody – there are very few parties who sort of stand back and look at this from a kind of distant, more objective perspective. I think one reason the Germans were brought into this was because some people thought Merkel was kind of removed from the fray in all this, and it would be a nice way for her to begin to leave her term in office, by bringing Europeans together on an important issue. And the Germans have played an important role here.

I don’t think anybody expects the U.S. to solve this thing, or if they do – I mean, I should rephrase that. Some people think the U.S. can just snap its fingers and solve this thing. Folks in Libya. That’s not the case. Our role, I think, is to help mobilize and galvanize international support for a solution both internally and externally.

QUESTION: How concerned are you about the terrorist threat given what’s going on on the ground?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: The terrorist threat in Libya?

QUESTION: Mm-hmm.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: This is very much one of the downsides of this conflict. It’s taken – people’s eyes has been taken – have been taken off the ball of the ability of terrorist groups to consolidate themselves. We saw them start to reform last year. AFRICOM conducted some strikes. Some of these were effective. And our sense is the threat has abated to an extent in terms of an organized threat, but Libya – especially if you look down in the south – is such a free for all that it’s – we’re already getting indications this is an environment that’s ripe for terrorist groups to reform themselves. And we want – one of the reasons this conflict needs to end as quickly as possible is so that you can have a stable, effective government in Tripoli that can be an effective partner in dealing with this threat.

MODERATOR: Time for one more question. Anyone?

QUESTION: Hi. Just can you expand a little bit more on how the Idlib situation is playing out here? Because it is reaching kind of a climax there.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I mean, you really need to talk to Ambassador Satterfield. I did go to Ankara about three weeks ago, and he and I made the rounds and talked to the Turks and talked about how their presence was an important factor in Tripoli, and it’s important to calibrate this presence correctly. And ultimately, of course, we want all foreign countries to get their troops out of Libya. The Idlib thing was starting to come to a crescendo then. There have just been some Turkish troops killed.

I mean, all I can say – my sense is that Syria, northern Syria is a huge priority for the Turks, also for the Russians, probably more important than Libya. But now the Libyan factor has complicated the equation for all concerned. And one thing you can be sure of is Moscow will figure out how to use this to maximum leverage, maximum advantage, as they pursue their interests in that particular region, both in consolidating Assad’s regime and in trying to gain a foothold in the Southern Med.

QUESTION: And what did your contacts with the Russians – you said you went to Ankara, but have you been talking to the Russians?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, I’ve had a couple of bilaterals with Bogdanov, the Russian deputy foreign minister, on the margins of these meetings in Berlin. Our ambassador in Moscow, Ambassador Sullivan, has met with Bogdanov. So we’ve begun to kind of trade views, but we don’t have an established bilateral pattern yet.

MODERATOR: Okay. Thanks.

QUESTION: Thank you, [Senior State Department Official]. Appreciate it.

QUESTION: Thank you.

U.S. Officials Speak on Developments in South Sudan’s Peace Process





MODERATOR: Thanks for being here. Today we have [Senior State Department Official], who’s going to talk to us about developments in South Sudan. The attribution for this talk will be background, senior State Department official. Sir, go ahead.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. Well, I don’t know how much – how closely you all follow the South Sudan peace process, but there’s a lot of peace processes in the world, and this is the one I’ve been following the most closely. I’ve been at post for about 21 months at U.S. Embassy in Juba, and when I started the conflict was still ongoing. They were in the throes of some peace talks that people weren’t sure were even that promising. But a few months later – in fact, in September 2018 – a peace agreement was signed which kicked the government and the country into what they call the pre-transitional period. They had a bunch of work that the agreements that had to take place before they could really start the transition. And the development, the pre-transition was extended a couple times, and it shook the confidence of the country in whether the peace process would even work.

But the big development that’s just happened is this last Saturday a new unity government as called for in the peace agreement came into being, and that kicked the country into the next phase, which is the transition phase. That’s supposed to last three years, and then the country’s first national election since its independence. So it’s a big deal if it all gets there. There’s a – the peace agreement is really a fulsome agreement. They call it the revitalized peace agreement, because it’s – the 2015 agreement that failed, they took that as the starting point for the new agreement. And it has a good, healthy reform agenda built into it. And this transition period is when they’re supposed to start getting to some of those reforms.

So everyone’s looking to see: Will this new unity government work? Will it remain an inclusive and unified government? What will their work habits be? And really, what I – the main take is if it works, if the parties work collaboratively, it has a chance of working. If they continue to be competitors within this government, it’s – it has a lot less chance of working. So a collaborative approach is what we’re looking for. We’re looking for signs of that collaboration, attitudinal changes. But really, collaboration is the word of the day there, I think. It was compromise leading up to this. The parties had to compromise to get here, but they’ve done that.

So now the work continues, and starts in some cases. A lot of the obligations for the pre-transition period haven’t, in fact, been completed. There’s still a lot of work to be done on the security sector.

QUESTION: You said “have not”? Sorry.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: May have to have a – there – the security sector was supposed to be unified, so the rebel armies and the government’s armies were supposed to have been brought together. And that wasn’t completed before, but there was enough confidence that it was starting, that process was starting. So this new government will have to continue that process in the security sector. They’ll have to kind of reinvent how they do governance. Again, a collaborative approach on that would be better. And then the other parts of the peace agreement that should kick in are a recovery program that includes returns of refugees and displaced people; improvements in public financial management and transparency and counter-corruption; transitional justice is a big chapter, so reconciliation and transitional justice. And then there’s also a chapter in the peace agreement on a constitutional process that will kick in leading to the elections. And that’s where they will have these big national dialogues about federalism and the shape of the country and the shape of the future government that comes after the transition period.

So it’s a big agenda, a very big agenda. And this is where we’re at right now. A lot of people will be looking to see what the international community’s role in this process will be. The key players are the neighbors of South Sudan, the IGAD countries, which were the guarantors of this process. Sudan is the new chairman of the IGAD, but Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda are all very key players here. And then if you look at concentric circles, the AU also has a lot of roles to play here in the peace process, and the United Nations. The UNMISS mission is one of the biggest – the biggest by some parameters – peacekeeping mission in the world right now. And we have the pen on the resolutions up in New York on the Security Council, so we and other internationals are paying a lot of attention to this as well.

But the nature of that partnership – on our part, at least – the nature of that partnership really will depend on the nature of this new government. Are they taking responsible decisions that are focused on the needs of their people, or are they taking self-interested decisions based on their own kind of political needs or their needs for power or corrupt finances? And so this is, again, a watchful situation, but it’s also more hopeful than it’s been in a long time.

So there’s – right now, this weekend in Juba, the mood was good, relatively good. But the – it doesn’t erase the healthy skepticism either, and people need to build their confidence up from the beginning. So confidence – I guess I’d talk about collaboration and compromise and confidence – it’s a lot of c words – but confidence of the people in their new government, confidence of the parties within the new government in each other, and confidence of the internationals in the process going forward. That’s just top-level stuff.

And there are other things happening in South Sudan, too – major floods this last year, locusts just came across the border. Those are things – if the ceasefire holds, and the ceasefire has been holding mostly since the peace agreement was signed in September 2018, these other problems which are major, major disasters, emergencies – the world knows how to help deal with those if we can. If the pause is there in the fighting, I think we can keep working on all these other issues.

But the – all the numbers are really off the charts in South Sudan. It is – it’s the biggest humanitarian emergency on the continent, and that means it’s big. The brutality of the civil war that lasted five years – really, it’s off the charts in a lot of ways, what happened to that country, and so the trauma that it’s left with is very, very serious and it pervades everything. So it’s a hefty set of tasks ahead, and – but it – again, it depends on this new government. Are they going to be collaborative and work in the interests of the people or not? So this is what we’re watching, and not just watching, we’re pushing as well. We’re applying pressure and engagement and trying to make sure that it works.

MODERATOR: Why don’t we take a few questions?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, please.

MODERATOR: All right.

QUESTION: (Inaudible) ask about the – you talked a couple times about the confidence level of – or there’s a great deal of suspicion. Given the fact that there is – this has been such a tortured road that has been really kind of dominated by personalities and personal vanity of the leaders, who were called out repeatedly about this, what is the confidence level that Machar and these guys are going to be able to actually get along and not just —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, well, like you said – yeah.

QUESTION: — not just plunder the place and do what they have done every single time since Garang died?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, it’s Kiir and Machar again, so confidence – like, there’s a lot of different kinds of confidence. Can these two parties and then the other parties – it’s a much more inclusive agreement than the last one. There’s five major parties to this peace agreement, and some of those are umbrellas that include many more parties. So that – the first thing about keeping the ceasefire going is that these parties have confidence in each other, but the citizens’ confidence in their government will be a little harder to come by, and we’ll be – we won’t jump into changing the way we do assistance right away either, so we’re very watchful. We don’t – for instance, none of our assistance goes to or through the government. We do it – we’re the biggest donors there because of the humanitarian emergencies, but our assistance does not go to or through the government because we can’t be sure that it will be well spent that way. But – I don’t know, you call —

MODERATOR: (Inaudible.) Carol.

QUESTION: I was in Juba a couple years ago and it was still pretty – sort of dicey. Aid workers were in fear for their lives, and convoys were being attacked, and the ambassador herself was living in the middle of a highly guarded compound. I’m wondering if the security situation has improved at all there, if you see any signs of that.

And also, just following up on what Matt said, beyond hope, do you – is there anything concrete to give you reason that Kiir and Machar will be able to put aside their rivalry? Because I still see them being described as bitter rivals.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: On the security situation, we’re still on that compound. I tell my colleagues here – I tell them we all live in hooches, but they’re the nicest hooches in the Foreign Service. We have a good degree of community and morale, but it is – we have a curfew, we’re unaccompanied, one-year assignments for most of my officers. So it’s a tough place, like some of the other places that you cover more frequently in your news programs.

That said, since that ceasefire went in place, there’s still a lot of criminality in the city and it’s very unpredictable for our local staff, for instance. For South Sudanese it’s a very difficult environment still, but it’s gotten much better since those times. Since the ceasefire went into effect, it’s – but it’s still a lot of crime, and the fear that it could revert to conflict is – that trauma lasts a lot longer than – people are going to be careful for a long time on that front.

It’s still – I mean, we – the UN keeps a running tab of humanitarians who are attacked or killed, and so we still sometimes throw up the factoid that it’s the most dangerous place in the world for humanitarians. There was a good long stretch at the beginning of 2019 for about nine months were there weren’t any casualties among humanitarian workers, but then starting in the fall there have been a few different attacks where people have been either killed or victims in other ways of attacks. So there’s – it’s still not – it’s still a dangerous place, but it’s better than it had been during the open conflict.

So a lot of violence in the country. Even with the national-level conflict right now under a ceasefire, there’s a lot of violence around the country in any case. There’s cattle-raiding violence, community-level violence that’s very serious – lots of guns in the country. And so it’s – but again, those are the kind of problems that if the ceasefire holds at the national level, there are methodologies and ways to start dealing with that and making some inroads in that.

Hope for the future. We all hope – I – one of the signs that this is different than before, there are assertions by all parties that it’s different this time, assertions which have to be tested and watched very carefully. So and there —

QUESTION: When you say “assertions” —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And there are some – there’s some talk about even kind of a – with a religious angle to it. The president talked about – in the speech when he was announcing the new government, talked about his experience with the Pope last spring where the Pope knelt down and kissed the feet of these leaders and really challenged them to be more humble and less – think more about their country and less about their personal power.

So —

MODERATOR: Robbie.

QUESTION: Yeah. I mean, to that point, it feels a bit like Groundhog Day where it’s the same actors making the same if not a similar deal. So to phrase it another way, I mean, do you – does the State Department have faith in Kiir and Machar themselves to carry forward this? What’s changed for these two personalities in the past three or four years that makes you say, yes, we believe you when you say these things are different this time, even though you’ve broken so many ceasefires and so many agreements before?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: No, well, this is not an agreement that we signed. In 2015 we signed that one. This one we’ve participated in in the sense of putting pressure on, and we have been watchful, and we have been commenting on it and pushing the parties along, but this is not our agreement in that sense. We haven’t – we don’t – it’s not our job now to pronounce it – that it’s good. We will be watchful, we will be – have healthy skepticism, and we will hopefully see some positive things that we can encourage and enable as well, but we’ll also be calling them if they’re – if they’re making some of the same mistakes.

So I think it’s more about watching their deeds rather than giving them a – pronouncing all is well, giving them a grade, a passing grade. It’s too early for that. And we’ll have to watch their institutional reforms – are some of these reforms going to kick in that mean – that can make it more than about the two individuals, right? One of the things that’s different about this agreement, this version of the agreement, the revitalized version, is it’s more inclusive than the other one. It’s not just the two parties. Now it’s a lot more parties. But it’s – these are still the two big men and this is still where most people focus. If it’s going to fall apart, it – this is where it would fall apart, along that fracture.

QUESTION: And just a quick follow-on. If it falls apart, is the U.S. readying any additional sanctions on senior South Sudanese leaders in that case? I know there were sanctions on one of the vice presidents I think late last year.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah, yeah. Well, I’ve told everybody we reserve the right to use all our diplomatic tools, including more sanctions, if necessary. We have the – we have all the same authorities in place, and I’ve made sure that that’s clear. Right now with the developments just this last week, Kiir did what we and others have been asking him to do – the last big stumbling block to making this new government was temporarily resolving this question of how many states there would be. And I don’t know if you know that background at all, but Kiir and his party favored 32 states; all the other opposition were saying 23. Kiir decided to make a decision not as the head of his party but as the head of the nation and agreed to a 10-state approach, which was the original number in the 2015 agreement. It’s complicated. But he did what the world asked him to do, which is get beyond his party’s immediate interests and make a decision that was – could facilitate the formation of this new government.

So he’s done that. Machar had to make a tough decision also whether he would go along with this, and they did. So, I mean, they made these tough decisions for themselves that they have to go back and sell to their coalitions, and so I think we want to see that – if that works – give them a little bit of a pat on the back for that, but not lose our watchfulness on this.

MODERATOR: Okay, there are a couple more. Yeah, Francesco.

QUESTION: Thank you. So yeah, to follow on the sanctions, is the U.S. considering lifting the designations you announced while there was a stalemate on the national unity government or are you prepared to wait and see?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. Well, there’s a lot of different kinds of sanctions. So on the individual, targeted sanctions, I’d – Treasury, OFAC, is who puts those in place, so there is some news out of there today that you might – if you want to track it down, I’d point you towards Treasury on one of those, but those – that’s one kind of sanction. There’s also Department of Commerce has some export controls on the – on U.S. companies that would be dealing with the petroleum and mining industry. Those are still there. Those, I think, should be there till there’s improvements in the investment climate, in the kind of transparency and public financial management field, make sure that they are spending their petroleum revenues in a way that benefits the country rather than contributes to the conflict.

And then the other big area of sanctions are the UN sanctions, including the arms embargo, and I think it’s way too early to consider lifting the arms embargo.

QUESTION: Is that – the Treasury action, this is the Israeli guy?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: That’s the one that’s today, yeah. Yeah.

QUESTION: Which were moved?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: So it – and I haven’t even seen anything on that, so that’s why I refer you to them, yeah.

QUESTION: But it’s under – it was under the South Sudan sanctions authority —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yes, it was under —

QUESTION: — but it wasn’t on a Sudanese –

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. And even those targeted ones are – yeah, it was because of his business in South Sudan, but he wasn’t a South Sudanese citizen, and his companies as well. We have an executive order under which some of the individual sanctions have been levied, and then we’ve also – there are some that have been levied under Global Magnitsky Act. And I’d have to check notes to make sure which is which, but I think this is under the executive order.

MODERATOR: Abbie.

QUESTION: I know that sexual violence was a huge weapon of war in the last couple of years, and with the formation of this unity government, I wonder what accountability you see for the perpetrators of those crimes or what the U.S. is involved in in helping the women who survived that.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Yeah. It was a huge problem during the war, and it’s not an automatic thing that with the end of the war even that this will go away as an issue, as a malady of – I mean, it’s a terrible situation. These numbers are, again, off the charts, and it’s a complicated phenomenon too. Some people will say it’s cultural; some people say it’s the conflict; and it’s probably a crazy mixture of both of those.

So there’s a lot of attention to this issue set, and we’ve been pushing all the individual parties to make progress on this even before they came together as a government. And so I think there will be a lot of internationals that continue to push. And there are some South Sudanese who are really becoming active in pushing for this. So I think the solutions for justice in these cases are going to have to be – it’s a mix. It’s going to need multiple tools. So we would love to see if there can be more developed in the South Sudanese justice systems and courts. The UN’s been helping with mobile courts to go out to places in the country that don’t have access to judicial services any other way than that. So that’s a starter kit, but they need to develop their own institutions.

But also, some of the mechanisms that are to be built into the reform efforts, chapter 5 of the peace agreement is on transitional justice. So there’s a Truth, Reconciliation, and Healing Commission. There is supposed to be a hybrid court – it’s an AU-South Sudan hybrid court for, one would think, the worst perpetrators of human rights atrocities during the war. So that has to be constituted. And all these tools together – there’s also other international mechanisms. There’s the UN Commission for Human Rights in South Sudan that’s established in Geneva. We used to have the pen on that when we were still on the council. And a report just came out from them that covered a whole range of human rights issues, including starvation as a crime, which is a kind of interesting take, but some of the gender-based violence reporting that’s come out of the UN system and our own reporting, it’s been just – it’s so difficult to deal with. I have to say it’s probably one of the most difficult things to kind of comprehend the magnitude of it when I got there, and I’ve worked in places like Taliban, Afghanistan, and I found South Sudan shocking at the level of sexual violence there.

MODERATOR: Do you have time for one more?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Sure.

MODERATOR: All right, take one more. Conor.

QUESTION: Just a quick —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: I’m just skipping out of a boring meeting, so this is —

QUESTION: A quick follow-up on Carol’s question about security.

QUESTION: And we can keep asking.
 
QUESTION: At the end of last month there was an embassy alert about a terror plot against the embassy and against U.S. personnel in the country. I was wondering if you could provide any more details on that, what groups, and whether or not that threat still remains in the country.
SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Well, we took steps. We had some evidence to believe that the embassy was being watched by bad guys. So we did a couple things. We had very good cooperation from the South Sudanese police and National Security Services to help us make sure security in our neighborhood was good, and we’ve done all the things that most embassies do. We took steps to vary our times and our routes, and in fact, we’d already had warnings out to the public about security conditions in South Sudan. So it didn’t look too different to too many people, but we did take some extra steps. I don’t know if we’ll ever kind of know the outcome of that, but —

QUESTION: Was it a local actor or —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Oh, don’t even know. I mean, that’s – yeah, it’s – don’t even – it doesn’t matter. We had to – it wasn’t a South Sudanese if that’s what you mean by local.

QUESTION: Right.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: But local like – yeah, I mean, in South Sudan. Yeah, and our embassy in Juba is what – but at the same time, there was – you know how everybody uses WhatsApp over there. So there was a WhatsApp message going around that wasn’t really what we were looking at, but that’s really what most people were reacting to. So – and that had all sorts of information that I never saw in our threat information, but I think it was – it was just – it came after the month where you had the events in Baghdad and there was an al-Shabaab attack in Kenya. And so I think some of that broader rumor stuff was actually earlier from just kind of the regional look at things.

So, yeah, that’s – but ours – we just took a – like I said, we – at the beginning, we already had curfew and we already had a lot of other security precautions. We just stepped up our good practices like varying your times and routes, so we’re hanging in there.

MODERATOR: All right. Thanks for being here with us today. Very much appreciate the —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Okay. Yeah. Thank you so much.

QUESTION: Thank you for taking the time.

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: And thank you for attention to South Sudan issues.

QUESTION: There isn’t anything more on terrain combat, is there?

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: Not lately, no. I mean, that was one of the things, when I got there, that the verdict wasn’t out yet, but then it has since – they’ve delivered that verdict, but there’s still stuff that needs —

QUESTION: They still haven’t paid, right? Or have they —

SENIOR STATE DEPARTMENT OFFICIAL: They’ve – I don’t think they have, no. I mean, that’s not the question. The question is on – terrain was just whether they – the people – some of the victims have gone back to ask for higher compensation, and that hasn’t gone anywhere yet.

QUESTION: Okay.